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10 The use of survey evidence in Australian 
trade mark and passing off cases 
Vicki Huang~ I<:imberlee Weatherall'and 
Elizabeth ~bster 
I. Introduction 
Consumer confusion lies at the heart of many actions for trade mark 
infringement, and under the common law tort ,of passing off and its 
statutory equivalents. The question on which liability often turI1S in both 
kinds of case is whether consumers would be confused' as a result of 
the conduct of the respondent or alleged infringer, although the type of 
confusion varies with the cause of action brought. To establish liability 
in passing off, the applicant must first show that they have a 'reputa-
tion', or goodwill,l that attaches to the applic&nt's get-up (for example 
insignia, brand name, or packaging) such that the get,up is, recognised 
by the public as distinctive of their goods and services.2 The appllcant 
must also prove that consumers are being misled into thinking there was 
some connection between applicant and respondent due t.o the respon-
dent's misuse of the applicant's get-up. 3 Registered trade mark 'Owners, 
however, do not have to establish reputation, as the registration i~ prima 
face evidence of distinctiveness. They only have to establish that the 
respondent's mark is 'deceptively similar' to theirs, this, being measured 
by looking at whether consumers would have been confused as a result 
of its use.4 Despite differences of language and legal tests; at their core, 
1 Lord MacNaghten in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co.'s Marga,rine Ltd 
[1990] AC 217, 223-4 describing goodwill as 'the attractive force which brings in 
custom', 
2 Reckit:t & Colman Products Ltd v. Borden Inc. (1990) 17 IPR 1, 7 (':li! Lemon Case'). 
3 ConAgra Inc. v. McCain Foods CAust) Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FeR 302 ('ConAgra'). 
4 This is determined by asking whether a consumer would be 'caused to wonder' whether 
goods sold under the infringing mark might come from the same source as those under 
the registered mark: Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v. Toowoomba Foundry!?fJJ Ltd (1954) 
91 CLR 592, 595. Thus reputation plays a lesser - and more complicated - role in 
registered trade mark cases, in part because the benefit of registering a trade mark is 
meant to be that a party does not, jf they hold a registered mark, have ,to estaplish that 
consumers associate that mark with them. In a limited number of cases - where marks 
are identical or substantially identical and the defendant is operating in the market in 
which the trade mark is registered - the question of confusion will not arise. 
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both actions, statutory and common law, depend vitally on the men-
tal associations consumers will make on seeing some brand, mark or 
. . . InsIgnIa. 
It might be expected that consumers would be the best source of evi-
dence about how consumers perceive, process and are confused by trade 
marks. 5 But obtaining that evidence is not straightforward. Applicants 
could (and often do) seek evidence of instances of actual confusion, such 
as cases where consumers have asked for, or purchased, goods under a 
mistaken impression as to their origin. They may call witnesses from the 
relevant trade or profession, or consumers or members of the public, 
to give direct evidence of their confusion, or put into evidence docu-
ments (such as letters or order forms) indicative of such confusion. Such 
evidence is said to have 'great weight', 6 although it is not clear that it 
should. Too often such evidence amounts to anecdotal evidence from a 
few people,7 who do not, in basic statistical terms, constitute a represen-
tative sample. 8 
We ought to be using more rigorous methods to test consumer 
responses to marks. Surveys9 can potentially be used to establish a range 
of facts relevant to the overriding legal question whether consumers 
are likely to be confused. Depending on how they are worded, surveys 
can establish the degree of recognition of a complainant's mark,10 how 
5 The alternative is a 'judicial estimation of the effect likely to be produced in the course 
of the ordinary conduct of affairs' by factors such as the similarity of the goods, of 
the marks, the sophistication of the audience at which those goods and marks are 
targeted, etc. (Australian Wbollen Mills Ltd v. FS walton & Co. Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 
641, 659 ('Australian Wbollen Mills')). Or, more pejoratively, 'judicial speculations and 
assumptions about what consumers believe' (Graeme W. Austin, 'Trademarks and the 
Burdened Imagination' (2004) 69 Brooklyn Law Review 827, 834). 
6 Australian Wbollen Mills, 658. 
7 See, e.g., ibid., where Justices Dixon and McTiernan state that '[e]vidence of actual 
cases of deception, if forthcoming, is of great weight', but in the very next sentence state 
that C [i]n the present case a few people said that they mistook a newspaper advertisement 
of the respondent for an advertisement of the appellant. But their evidence amounted, 
we think, to very little ... [the learned primary judge] was right in refusing to act on 
an account of the mental processes set up by perusing a newspaper advertisement, an 
account given by witnesses long after the occurrence of what must have been a casual 
and unimportant mental experience' (ibid. 658). 
8 State Government Insurance Corporation v. Government Insurance Office of NSW (1991) 28 
FCR 511,528-9 (,State Government Insurance Corporation'). For a nice summary of the 
issues with such evidence, see James Lahore, James Dwyer and Ann Dufty, Patents, Trade 
Marks & Related Rights (Buttetworths: Sydney, 1996), vol. 1 A (at Service 72) [85,020]. 
9 We understand surveys to range from basic attitudinal questionnaires to more complex, 
controlled, consumer perception studies. 
10 See, e.g., Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pry Ltd v. Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 
18 IPR 309 (,Sterling Pharmaceuticals'); Kellogg Co. v. PB Foods [1999] FCA 1610 
(' Kellogg'). 
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consumers encounter marks or make their purchase decisions,l1 and, 
by testing individuals' responses to an alleged infringer's mark, "whether 
consumers are likely to be confused. 12 Partjcipants in a properly con-
" " , 
ducted survey should constitute a representative sample, and statistical , 
techniques can be used to correct for sampling biases. This allows us to 
draw inferences from the sample about the whole populati~n:. Thus the 
use of the survey technique can allow a range of views to be accounted 
for without the expense of calling multiple witnesses, ~d with~ut taking 
up court time. In the US, Beebe notes that it -is 'generally thought that 
survey evidence is the best evidence of actual confusion, and indeed, that 
a good survey has the potential to supersede' other forms of eyidence; 
,E 
quoting an American Bar Association statement that surveys are 'tradi-
tionally one of the most classic and most persuasive and most informative 
forms of trial evidence that trade mark lawyers utilize' .13 
There has been some research into the effectiveness of surveys "in trade 
mark cases in the US. In 2004, Graenie Austin published an 'impression-
istic' review often years of decisions, finding that survey evidence 'carries 
weight in trade mark infringement cases relatively infrequently'. 14 Sur-
veys were proffered around 57.4 per cent of the time: In 2006, Barton 
Beebe published a more detailed empirical" study' of the rang~ of factors 
that influence a finding of confusion in the US,15 which sought to ascer-_ 
tain which factors were most important in supporting a finding of likely 
consumer confusion. Beebe found that survey evidence was ad,dressed in 
only 20 per cent of the court decisions in his sample. 16 More recently, 
Sarel and Marmorstein conducted a study" of tt,ade mark infringement 
cases decided between 2001 and 2006 in US" district courts,17 looking 
particularly at whether surveys made a difference depending on the sim-
ilarity of the applicant's and respondent's trade marks. They concluded, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, that surveys were" more vruuable where marks 
were less similar. 
In Australia, surveys have, however, been the "subject of various con-
cerns. Historically surveys were viewed as mere hearsay: this view was 
11 See, e.g., Playcorp Group of Companies Pry Ltd v. Perer Bodum AIS (2010) 84 IPR 542. 
12 State Government Insurance Corporation. 
13 Barton Beebe, 'An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringe-
ment' (2006) 94 California Law Review 1581, 1641-
14 Austin, 'Trademarks', 834. The study examined cases decided between May 1993 and 
May 2003. 
15 Beebe, 'Empirical Study' . 16 Ibid. 1641. 
17 Dan Sare1 and Howard Marmorstein, 'The Effect of Consumer Surveys and Actual 
Confusion Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment' (2009) 99 
Trademark Reporter 1416. 
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only rejected in 1990. 18 The practitioner-oriented literature is replete 
with horror stories about the expense of obtaining such evidence, and 
about trials made lengthy by disputes over survey evidence.19 Before 
embarking on a survey, a party cannot guarantee favourable results, but 
under Federal Court practice, the court expects that notice should be 
given, in writing, by the party proposing the survey to other parties in 
the proceeding.2o The practitioner literature also asserts that courts will 
not view survey evidence favourably:21 whether owing to criticisms of 
the methodology; because it is 'overly elaborate' and hence a waste of 
resources,22 or, more fundamentally, because the question of consumer 
confusion is for the judge to determine,23 unless the consumers in the 
'target market' are some kind of 'special group' into whose minds a 
judge may not have insight (for example, pre-teenage girls).24 In short, 
the belief has been expressed that 'in many cases [survey] evidence can 
create more problems than it solves' .25 
Given these beliefs, and the risks and costs of conducting a survey, it 
is natural for parties to be interested in how courts use and rely (or do 
not rely) on surveys. There has been no study of which we are aware 
of these questions in Australia in recent times. This chapter plugs this 
gap in our knowledge, by examining the population of trade mark and 
passing off cases decided in Australia in the period 1 January 1990 to 
1 April 2010. We have sought to assess the influence of survey evidence 
on the probability of winning a trade mark or a passing off dispute in 
court. The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Part II outlines 
the methodology of the study; Part III provides a descriptive analysis of 
18 Arnotts Ltd v. Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FeR 313, 360-1 ('Arnotts'). 
19 Lahore, Patents, Trade Marks 185,030]; State Government Insurance Corporation. 
20 Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 13 - Survey Evidence, 25 September 2009. 
Even this process does not guarantee the court will accept the resulting evidence. In 
Optical 88 Ltdv. Optical 88 Pty Ltd (No.2) [2010] peA 1380, the applicant's survey was 
given to the respondent's solicitors for criticism and comment. Some minor changes 
were made but a number of issues remained between the parties. After 9,164 consumers 
were approached (460 giving a complete interview), the court found the survey failed 
to 'measure whether and, if so, to what extent, members of the chosen population of 
interest were misled' ([406]). 
21 See, e.g., Mark Davison, Tracey Berger and Annette Freeman, Shanahan's Australian 
Law o/Trade Marks and Passing Off (4th edn, Lawbook, Pyrmont, 2008),284-5. 
22 Neutrogena Corp. v. Golden Ltd [1996] RPC 473, 485-6 Oacob J.); Sterling Pharmaceu-
ticals Pry (1990) 18 IPR 309, 328; Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v. Darrell Lea Chocolate 
Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719, 726 [30]-[31] (Heerey J.). 
23 Arnotts, 362; Interlego AG v. Croner Trading Pry Ltd (1992) 39 FeR 348 at 387 ('Inter-
[ego'); Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v. Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No. 8) (2008) 
75 IPR 557 at 573-74 (,Cadbury (No. 8)'). 
24 Pacific Publications Pry Ltd v. Next Publishing Pty Ltd (2005) 222 ALR 127; Gas Corpo-
ration v. Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] FeA 773. 
25 Lahore, Patents, Trade Marks [85,035]. 
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the data; and Part N presents the results from the, empirical model. Part 
V offers thoughts on why surveys are rarely relied on. 'Part VI concludes 
with some policy suggestions. 
II. Methodology 
The data for this study is the population of 353 trade mark infringe-
ment and passing off cases decided by both state:and federal Australian 
courts26 over the period 1 January 1990-1 April 2010. Relevant" trade 
mark infringement and passing off cases were located by undertaking 
broad keyword searches in the LexisN exis legal database27 and the£" read 
and coded by a legally trained researcher. Resul~s were checked and con-
firmed by a second legally trained researcher. The pOl'ulatiqn comprised, 
broadly speaking, all cases in the tort of passi;n:g 9ff and/or trade mark 
infringement. Coded variables comprised: 
• Bibliographic data. The date and citation of~e judgment; the court; 
judge; the nature of the case (trade mark infringement and/or-passing 
off), whether the case was a trial, appeal or. an appeal from the Aus-
tralian Trade Marks Office . 
• Outcome (win, partial win, or loss). A complete win for the applicant 
was defined as when they were successful on an issues pleaded; a 
complete loss was a loss on those issues; and a 'p~al' win was ·defined 
as when the applicant won on only a subset of the issues. If a win/loss 
was unclear (for example if the case was sent bac~ to a lower court on 
remitter) then the cases was also recorded as .'partial'. 
26 A case was 'decided' if there was resolution ofrhe case, whethermterlocutory, summary 
or final following a trial. 
27 The searches undertaken were full text searches, looking for the terms 'trade marks act' 
and 'infringement' or 'passing off using 'All Subscribed Australian Case Sources' in the 
relevant period. This search identified 2,180 cases. Duplicates were removed. We also 
removed cases that focused on procedural issues, ownership disputes, discov~ry, costs, 
damages, or on copyright, patents, designs law or contract interpretation. Some appeals 
from trade mark oppositions were also excluded, where based on issues other than 
confusion, for example, rejection under s. 41 (distinctiveness) or s. 27 (ownership). We 
included appeals from opposition decisions based on s. 44 and s. 60, treating these as, 
in effect, disputes over conflicting marks. Cases that turned. on whether the respondent 
'used' the applicant's mark as a trade mark were also discarded as not being concerned 
with confusion. We have also not included cases of misleading or deceptive' conduct 
under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act. While some s. 52 cases are akin to the trade 
mark infringement cases being considered here, many are not, and it was too diffiCult to 
separate them out. Our belief is that most cases which are of the kind considered in trade 
mark infringement and passing off - where the concern is that consumers are likely to 
be misled as to the origin of the goods - passing off will be pleaded and hence the case 
will be caught in our keyword search. 
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• Trade mark similarity (more similar or less similar). The degree of 
similarity betwee9 the trade marks or between the get-ups.28 
• Market information. Whether the case involves counterfeit goods or 
is an 'ordinary' trade mark infringement case,29 whether the respon-
dent was involved in the same market as the applicant (or something 
'related' but not directly competing), and the company status of the 
applicant and respondent. 
• Evidence. Whether evidence was tendered to establish confusion 
and/or reputation; whether survey evidence30 or expert evidence31 was 
tendered; whether evidence in the form of surveys and experts was 
relied on, partially relied on or not relied on by the court. It is important 
not to put too much weight on this variable, as it was extremely diffi-
cult to code consistently. In assessing reliance, we looked at whether the 
judge relied on the evidence (such as the surveyor expert) in proving an 
issue; that is, to prove consumer confusion or to prove the existence of 
reputation. If it wasn't clear whether the judge did or did not rely on the 
evidence, it was coded as 'partially relied on'. If the judge admitted the 
evidence but did not rely on it, then it was coded as 'no reliance'. 
If the evidence was described as persuasive then it was coded as 
'relied on'. 32 
Over the 1990-2010 period, only 33 (or 10.4 per cent of the non-
counterfeiting) cases discussed survey evidence.33 This small absolute 
28 Similarity of marks is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the establishment 
of liability. This variable recognises that similarity is a matter of degree. Similarity 
was coded based on the judgment of the reader, based on the approach of Sarel and 
Marmorstein, 'Effect of Consumer Surveys', 1435. Trade marks or get-ups were coded 
as either 'More Similar' or 'Less Similar' where 'More Similar' marks are 'identical 
or very close in aural and visual similarity' for example MAGNILITE and MAGNI-
LIGHTS. Cases that were not classed as 'More Similar' were coded as 'Less Similar'. 
For example, 'BIG APPLE DELI' and 'BIG BAGELS DELI' are 'Less Similar'. 
29 For a description of this distinction and its significance in trade mark litigation in 
Australia, see Jason Bosland, Kimberlee Weatherall and Paul Jensen, 'Trade Mark and 
Counterfeit Litigation in Australia' (2006) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 347. 
30 See above n. 9. 
31 An 'expert' was a witness that was referred to in the judgment as an 'expert'. An expert 
witness is impartial and has an overriding duty to the court. See, e.g., Federal Court 
of Australia, Practice Note eM 7 - Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of 
Australia, 29 September 2009. 
32 Determining whether the court relied on particular evidence to prove a particular issue 
was often difficult. This was especially so in appellate cases where evidence is not 
reviewed de novo. We had to make inferences as to whether the appellate court followed 
the trial judge's treatment of the original evidence. Another problem was that many of 
the cases were interlocutory decisions, not involving a final determination of the merits 
of the case. 
33 38 surveys were discussed in 33 cases. 
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Table 10.1 Case 1jJpe, A ustralian trade mark and passing off 
cases, 1990--2010 
Case Type 
Trade mark Trademark 
infringement Passing off infringemeI?-t 
Counterfeit? & passing off only only ,Total 
No 85 168 .64 3p 
les 14 0 22 36 
Total 99 168 86 ~53/ 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Includes 
counterfeiting cases. 
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number both limits the conclusions which can be drawn from a straight-
forward statistical analysis, and itself warrants explanation: if survey evi-
dence has the potential to be the best source of information about likely 
consumer reactions to marks, why is it not used more often? In order to 
answer this question, we have analysed the courtS' comments on evidence 
in trade mark cases. 
III. Descriptive analysis 
In Table 10.1 we show that of the 353 cases, 36 were counterfeiting. Of 
the non-counterfeiting cases, 168 were passihg off only, 64 were trade 
mark infringement only and 85 were both. Sinc'e almost all of the coun-
terfeiting cases were straightforward cases of infringement (in 34 of the 36 
cases the applicant achieved either a partial or complete win), we exclude 
these cases from further analysis. 34 This leaves 317 cases of whi~h 260 
were first instance decisions. 
Figure 10.1 presents the number of cases involving survey evidence 
each year and compares this with the total number, and the number 
involving expert witness evidence. It reveals a clear doWnward trend 
in the use of survey evidence with a slight rising preference for expert 
witnesses. 
In Table 10.2 we indicate the percentage of. cases in which either 
surveyor expert evidence was tendered (bearing in mind there are 
34 On average counterfeiting cases took 1.1 hearing day!>, compared with 2.4 days for 
passing off and trade mark infringement, which illustrates the less complicated nature of 
the former. To similar effect, see Bosland et al., 'Trade Mark and Counterfeit Litigation'. 
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20 
15 
Table 10.2 Percentage a/trade mark and passing off cases tendering 
surveyor expert evidence by win status, Australia, 1990-2010 
Type of 
evidence 
tendered 
Lossa for 
applicant (% of 
all/loss cases) 
-------' 
Type of evidence tendered by applicant 
Win or partial 
winb for applicant 
(% of all win 
cases) 
Survey 8.6 6.7 
Expert 21.6 12.9 
Type of evidence tendered by respondent 
Survey 2.9 3.4 
Expert 12.9 10.1 
Both outcomes 
(% of all cases) 
7.6 
16.7 
3.2 
11.4 
Notes: a Applicant lost on all issues. b Applicant was successful on at least some 
issues pleaded or if the outcome was unclear (for example if the case was sent 
back to a lower court on remitter). 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes counter-
feiting cases. 
1 0 _"""""M''''''_'''''''''''~_''' __ "W'_'''" .. "."."" •. ".""".".""""'"'-"'"-'~--'''~-''''-''''"'''''''-''''----'-'''~"''-'~''-'''''." ......... " ......... '" .. "."'--,,---~ .... -f~,-.. -.-... 
I , , , 
,. /" ..... " _---_ .... ___ '" I ' .. 5 .. w/' ..... '!tr.. ................... ,' ••••••••••••• ....... j!'" ". '"'' ..... -.----~ •• " .... "~--,,···,···,,··,,··,·· .. ········,·,··"' .. · .. "'·"'··I·,, .. "''''·\,,·""', .. " ....... . 
; ....... ___ ..... ", " I 
~/ v ol-~;===~~~~~~~==~~~~~~~ 
--- Survey evidence ----- Expert evidence --- All cases 
Figure 10.1 Number of trade mark cases using surveyor expert wimess 
evidence; all Australian courts, 1990-2009 
Note: The chart excludes 2010 as the data for 2010 are incomplete. 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes 
counterfeiting cases. 
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317 cases in total). This data is further dis aggregated according to 
whether the final decision involved a win or partialwin for the applicant or 
a loss. According to this data, only 7.6 per cent of applicants and '3.2 per 
cent of respondents tendered survey evidence. 35 ~xpert evidence, which 
is apt to be cheaper, was more frequent at 16.7 and 11.4 per cent re~pec­
tively. We note that these tables do not say that the remaining majority of 
cases involved no evidence at all. The remaining cases coUld have involved 
evidence of the less-than-rigorous kinds criticised earlier in this chapter -
such as single instances of consumer confusion or~ perhaps, marketing fig-
ures to establish the distinctiveness of indicia to the applicant. The point, 
rather, is that such a low proportion of cases are going beyond these 'evi-
dential bits and pieces'. Note too that according to law and econonfics 
theory, the cases that we are looking at - those that make it all the way to 
court - ought to be the 'borderline' cases which could go either way: the 
very cases in which one would expect evidence would 'be nece~sary.36. 
Table 10.3 shows that about one-third of applicants led evid~nce, 
of any type, to prove confusion and slightly 'more led evidence on 
reputation. 37 There was little variation in this: 'led evidence' rate by 
win status. However, applicants were twice as likely to lead evidence 
on either confusion or reputation as respondents. Again there was no 
difference (statistically speaking) in the percent3:ges across both parties 
according to whether they won or lost the case. Given the importance of 
establishing distinctiveness in passing off only case~) we al~o exaniined 
this data for this group (results not presented). While we expected that 
reputation would be almost axiomatic for this group,. we found that the 
percentage leading surveyor expert evidence to establish reputation was 
still under 50 per cent.38 
Table 10.4 shows the percentage of cases where the court re!ied on 
a piece of evidence in their decision. Although the, reliance data was 
problematic, two points can be inferred: the first is the very low rate of 
reliance on either surveyor expert evidence. Part of this low rate stems 
from the low rate at which the evidence is tendered (see Table 10.2). The 
35 Even taking the lower US estimates concerning the use of survey evidence, th,e utilisation 
rate in Australia is less than half the rate of use of such inst:ruments in the US: 3,or 7 per 
cent depending on the party, as compared to closer to 20 per cent of cases. according to 
Beebe's US study ('Empirical Study'). 
36 See generally George Priest and Benjamin Klein, 'The SeIection of Disputes forUtiga-
tion' (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studz"es 1. 
37 Four additional cases were 'led on confusion' but were not classified by whe¢.er this 
was led by the counsel for the applicant or respondent. Two additional cases were 'led 
on reputation' but were not classified by whether this was led by the counsel for the 
applicant or respondent. 
38 Similarly for first instance passing off cases. 
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Table 10.3 Percentage o/trade mark and passing off cases 
according to issue to prove by win status) Australia) 1990-2010 
Issue to prove 
Lossa for 
applicant (% of 
a11loss cases) 
Evidence led by ,applicant to prove 
Confusion 33.1 
Reputation 36.0 
Evidence Led by respondent to counter 
Confusion I 14.4 
Reputation 15.8 
Win or partial 
winb for 
applicant (% of 
all win cases) 
34.8 
40.0 
15.2 
12.4 
Both outcomes 
(% of all cases) 
34.1 
38.2 
14.8 
13.9 
Notes: a Applicant lost on all issues. b Applicant was successful on at least some 
issues pleaded or if the outcome was unclear (for example if the case was sent 
back to a lower court on remitter). 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes counter-
feiting cases. 
Table 10.4 Percentage of trade mark and passing off cases according 
to evidence court relied on by win status, Australia) 1990-2010 
Type of 
evidence 
relied upon 
Lossa for 
applicant (% of 
all loss cases) 
Applicant's evidence relied upon by court 
Win or partial 
winb for 
applicant (% of 
all win cases) 
Survey 2.2 1.1 
Expert 8.6 5.6 
Respondent's evidence relied upon by court 
Survey 0.0 0.6 
Expert 7.9 3.9 
Both outcomes 
(% of all cases) 
1.6 
6.9 
0.3 
5.7 
Notes: a Applicant lost on all issues. b Applicant was successful on at least some 
issues pleaded or if the outcome was unclear (for example if the case was sent 
back to a lower court on remitter). 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes counter-
feiting cases. 
second point that can be inferred is that the parties' evidence does not 
appear to affect ,a party's chance of success. For example, the applicants' 
survey evidence was relied on in 2.2 per cent of the cases where the 
applicant lost but only 1.1 per cent of cases where the applicant won (or 
partially won). A similar pattern is apparent for respondents. 
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Table 10.5 Percentage of trade mark and passing off cases tendering 
evidence by type and simz7arity of market) AU5tralia,.1990-:c2010 
SimHarity of Market 
All markets 
191 
Type of evidence 
relied upon 
Samea (% of 
same cases) 
Similarb (% of 
similar cases) 
Differen( (% of 
different case) (% of all cases) 
Type of evidence tendered by applicam 
Survey 9.3 1.6 
Expert 15.8 17.2 
Type of evidence tendered by respondent 
Survey 4.7 0.0 
Expert 11.6 7.8 
7.9 
21.1 
0.0 
15.8 
7.6 
16.7 
3.2 
11.4 
Notes: a 'Same? would be an applicant and respondent in the 'Restaurant' services· business. 
b 'Similar' would be an applicant in the 'Game Manufacturing' business vs. a respondent in 
the 'Game Reconditioning' business. C 'Different' would be an applicant in:Hotel services' 
vs. a respondent in 'Restaurant services' . 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes counterfeiting cases. 
Table 10.5 shows that survey evidence is more likely to be tendered 
by the applicant when the market is different or the same but has been 
only tendered by the respondent when the marke~ is the same. Although 
the use of surveys is limited, respondents are using them when their case 
is more tenuous. It suggests that they understand the role of objective 
evidence in bearing upon a case that is more difficult to prove. 
Finally, Table 10.6 presents data on evidence" led by the business status 
of both applicants and respondents. It reveals that surVeys are most likely 
to be tendered by Australian public companies {that is, incorporated with 
ASIC). Overseas companies only tendered a survey when they "are the 
applicants, and 'other' unincorporated business entities never tendered 
a survey. 
IV. Empirical model 
Use of survey evidence by either party should indicate that the" applicant 
believes he or she has a strong case and, in addition, it sho~d also add 
substance to the case such that he or she is more likely to prove their 
case.39 In addition, given the raison dJetre of the trade mark system is to 
" " 
39 We think this is true owing to a combination of three facts. First, theory predicts that an 
applicant who makes it all the way to court likely believes their case is strong: otherwise 
they would be more likely to settle earlier on: Priest and Klein, 'Selection of Disputes', 
Second, to tender a survey the applicant must be confident about it strengthening the 
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Table 10.6 Percentage of trhde mark and passing off cases tendering evidence 
by type and business status) Australia) 1990-2010 
Overseas Private Public All 
Company Companya Companya businesses 
(% OS (% private (% public Otherb (% all 
Applicant Status company) company) company) (% other) cases) 
Type of evidence tendered by applicant 
Survey 8.3 3.8 14.1 0.0 7.6 
Expert 18.1 13.1 26.8 7.1 16.7 
Type of evidence tendered by respondent 
Survey 0.0 1.8 9.3 0.0 3.2 
Expert 25.0 9.0 16.0 4.2 11.4 
Note: a Public company includes subsidiaries. b Comprises individuals and unincorporated 
organisations. 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes counterfeiting cases. 
prevent consumer confusion, we also expect counsel that led evidence 
beyond the anecdotal on the issue of confusion or reputation and those 
that provide survey evidence of likely confusion should also be more likely 
to win. 
However, we also expect the outcome to be affected by other factors -
which we call control variables - such as other forms of evidence or the 
similarity of the industry or market. We do not believe that the financial 
resources of the two parties should affect the decision since the latter 
should be determined on a point ofIaw. While the reality is that wealthier 
litigants are more able to sustain a dispute and therefore to end up in 
court, once there, wealth should not affect the outcome. However, to 
test our proposition that wealth and financial resources do not matter, 
we include the business status of each party in our control variables. 
Before we launch into the estimations, we need to discuss what statis-
ticians call 'selection issues'. Not all cases end up in court - the over-
whelming majority are settled 'privately'. 40 In these settlements, survey 
case: first, because conducting a survey according to Federal Court practice (that is, 
giving the other side prior notice) holds some risk unless a party is confident of the 
result, 0[, second, if Federal Court practice was not followed (note the majority of cases 
came from the Federal Court), and prior notice to the other side was not given, the 
survey would not have been tendered at all unless it was of assistance (a party will not 
tender evidence they consider unhelpful to their case). 
40 For empirical confirmation in IP cases (in the US), see William Landes, 'An Empirical 
Analysis oflntellectual Property Litigation: Some Preliminary Results' (2004) 41 Hous-
ton Law Review 749. No similar research has been done in Australia in relation to trade 
mark, but for a similar result in patent litigation in Australia, see Fiona Rotstein and 
Kimberlee Weatherall, 'Filing and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the Federal Court: 
1995-2005' (2007) 68 Intellectual Property Forum 65. 
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evidence may be produced and be used to settle the case. We do not have 
any data on how often this occurs or what role surve.y evid~nce has played 
in the final outcome. We can deduce however that the cases that end up 
before the courts are unlikely to be representative of the whole popula-
tion of trade mark disputes. 41 This means that there may be biases in our 
estimations. Without data to be able to compare the whole popula~on 
of disputes with our dataset, weare unable to give further guidan.ce on 
whether this biases matters and in what direction. 
We modelled the court's decision as a single equation with 'clustering' 
on the case identifier.42 The unit of analysis is the characteristics' of 
each party to each dispute. The dependent variable - the winabilityr'Of 
the case, which we call Win* - is modelled as a function of: whether 
counsel for each party tendered survey evidence (Survey);· the. quality of 
the survey evidence as indicated by whether the court relied on this surv~y 
evidence (SurveyRely) and whether counsel led evidence on confusion 
(ConfusionLed) or reputation (ReputationLed). 
As mentioned, we also include a set of control factors. (called )() -
comprising other forms of evidence such as the Use of expert evid'ence 
(Expert); the quality of this evidence as indicated by whether the court 
relied on this expert evidence (ExpertRely); the similarity of the ind~stry 
or market (SimilarMarket); whether the trade mark is assessed by the 
authors as being more or less similar (SimilarTM); and the business status 
of the applicant and respondent (Overseas company~ Private company, 
Public company, Other). 
We model winability (Win*) as: 
Win; = /31 SurveYi + /32SurveyRelyi + fhConJusionLedi 
+ /34 ReputationLedi + {3X + ci 
Win; = {~ if Wz·n* > 0 if Win* < 0 
(1) 
(2) 
41 While some cases may be driven by vexatious litigants - who have motives other.than a 
'win' on their mind - most cases wil.l end up in court because both parties believe that 
their own probability of winning multiplied by the value of winning exceeds the value 
of the counterfacrual (being the probability of losing multiplied by the costs of losing). 
Since the default position in the case of IP litigation usuap.y involves continuation of 
the alleged infringing behaviour, considerable profits must be at stake for the applicant 
to pursue the case to COurt. In addition, both parties must have the means to sustain 
a court case. Essentially, therefore, the cases before us should represent more'valuable 
trade marks, disputes close to the knife edge of a win or loss, and disputes between 
parties with assets. On the relevant theory, see Priest and Klein, 'Selection of Disputes' . 
42 Clustering is a statistical process that accounts for the fact that our pair of observa-
tions for each case share common unobservable factors and therefore the error term. in 
equation (1) will be correlated. 
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The dependent variable, Win, has been coded as binary so we estimate it 
as a discrete dependent variable model. Each case has two observations -
one for each party. The dependent variable and the explanatory vari-
ables are constructed in the manner described below but for a complete 
description of the questions used in the construction of each variable, 
refer to Table Al in Appendix A (at the end of this chapter). 
Dependent variable. As mentioned, our dependent variable - Win-
was coded = 1 if the party was successful on at least some issues pleaded 
or if the outcome was unclear (for example if the case was sent back to a 
lower court on remitter). Win was coded =0 if the party lost on all issues. 
Explanatory variables. Survey was coded =1 if counsel for that party 
tendered survey results as evidence, =0 otherwise. SurveyRely was coded 
as = 1 if the courts indicated that they relied on the survey evidence, =0 
otherwise; ConfusionLed was coded as = 1 if counselled evidence to prove 
confusion, or misrepresentation, =0 otherwise; ReputationLed was coded 
as = 1 if counsel led evidence to prove reputation grounds and it was a 
passing off case only, =0 otherwise. 
Control variables. Expert was coded = 1 if counsel for that party 
tendered expert evidence, =0 otherwise. ExpertRely was coded as = 1 if 
the courts indicated that they relied on the expert evidence, =0 otherwise; 
SimilarMarket was manually coded =3 if the party alleging infringement 
was considered to be in the same market as the alleged infringer; =2 if 
the suing party was in a similar market as the alleged infringer; = 1 if 
in a different market. SimilarTM was based on the Sarel-Marmorstein 
test: = 1 if, judged by this test, the par~ alleging infringement had a trade 
mark that was similar to the alleged infringer, :::::0 otherwise. The business 
status of the party (OverseasCompany, PrivateCompany, PublicCompany, 
'Other') was manually coded from the name given on the court records. 
All private companies which were subsidiaries of public companies were 
coded as PublicCompany. Company structure was identified from ASIC 
and IBISWorld databases and the internet. 
Table 10.7 presents these results from the estimations using first all 
the cases (columns 1 and 2), second, first instance cases only (column 3) 
and third, cases that were exclusively passing off (column 4). The first 
column, which provides estimates for the coefficients on all variables, 
clearly shows that tendering survey evidence did not affect the probability 
of winning the case. This iSrquite a strong result and holds regardless of 
the number and type of other co-variates. 
The easiest way to read the table is to look at the sign of the coefficients 
[the /3s from equation (1)] and their statistical significance (as indicated 
by whether there is an *, ** or *** beside it). If there are no asterisks, 
then one can assume that the variable had no influence over whether 
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Table 10.7 Determinants of a win or partial win (to either party) 
Dependent variable: (3J.First ' (4) Passing off 
Win or partial win (1) All cases (2) All cases instance ca~es case:s 'exclusively 
Explanatory variables 
Survey -0.0731 
(0.268) 
SurveyRely -0.449 
(0.614) 
ConfusionLed 0.0661 
(0.129) 
ReputationLed 0.207* 0.205* 0.345** 
(0.124) (0.120) (0.165) 
Control variables 
Expert -0.372** -0.291** -0.383* -0.307 
(0.183) (0.142) (0.196) (0.189) 
SurveyRely 0.172 0.332 
(0.241) (0.249) 
SimilarMarket 0.0270 0.136 
(0.0786) (0.0867) 
SimilarTM 0.546*** 0.543*** 0.568***. 0.736**>1' 
(0.139) (0.139) (0.~55) (0.198) 
Overseas company 0.264 0.188 0.270* 
(0.175) (0.143) (0.160) 
Private company 0.123 0.375*** 
(0.133) (0.133) 
Other (inc individua0i -0.269* -0,356*** -0.347** 
(0.159) (0,132) (0.147) 
" 
Constant -0.299 -0.152* -0.416** ~.565**~ 
(0.201) (0.0793) (0.189) (0.132) 
Observations 622 622 508 326 
Notes: Probit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses .. *** p<0.01" ** p<0.05? * p<O.l. 
Base case = Public company. 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. Excludes count¢ei1::ing cases. 
or not the party won the case. Given this, we can see that neither the 
coefficient for Survey (-0.0731) or SurveyRely (-0.449) have' asterisks 
and are therefore statistically insignificant. This means that we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that tendering or relying on survey evidence had no effect 
on the judgeme'!lt. 
The results also show that leading evidence on reputation, having a 
, , 
similar looking mark, being an overseas company (in first instance cases), 
Table 10.8 Marginal effects on the probability of a 
win or partial win ho either party) statistically 
st'gnificant variables only 
Dependent variable: Win 
Explanatory variables 
ReputationLed 
Control variables 
Expert 
SimilarTM 
Other (ineZ. individual) i 
Percentage point change 
8.0 
-10.8 
21.6 
-14.7 
Notes: Derived from the estimate in Table 10.8, column (2) 
Source: Australian Trade Mark Case Database, 1990-2010. 
Excludes counterfeiting cases. 
and being a Australian private company (in exclusively passing off cases) 
had a positive effect on winning. The coefficients for these variables are 
positive and statistically significant. However, tendering expert evidence 
and being an 'other' business type (such as an individual or unincorpo-
rated entity) tended to have a negative effect on winning. The coefficients 
for these variables are negative and statistically significant. Table 10.8 
converts these coefficients into changes to the probability of winning. 
It shows for example that leading evidence on reputation, versus not 
leading on reputation, ra~ses the probability of winning by 8.0 percent-
age points. If the party alleging infringement had a similar looking trade 
mark to the other party, the probability of winning that was 21.6 percent-
age points higher. Tendering expert evidence, versus not tendering expert 
evidence, was associated with a probability of winning that was 10.8 per-
centage points lower. This may be due to expert evidence being tendered 
in only weak cases but may also be associated with the calibre of the 
evidence. 
V. Cotnmentary: why so little survey evidence, 
and so little reliance? 
Our figures show that the initial enthusiasm for surveys after Arnotts Ltd 
v. Trade Practices Commission43 in 1990 has rapidly declined; and that 
43 (1990) 24 FeR 313,360-1 (Fun Federal Court). 
survey use is now infrequent. Our analysis also suggests that surveys 
have limited impact on the results in these cases. The'se facts are clearly 
related. We think that parties are rationally deciding not to bother with 
costly surveys that will not be used by the courts. This decision is made 
easier by the fact that the courts have not provided complainantS with 
any real incentive to obtain survey evidence. Courts have made it clear 
that they are prepared to make decisions on the likelihood of consumer 
confusion, without any empirical evidence, on the basis of their own 
inferences and judicial 'common sense', from looking at the competing 
marks, marketing budgets and a~tivities. Judges have insisted that it is 
their right and duty to make that determination.44 In most cases where 
judges comment on the absence of survey evidence they express little 
concern.45 Indeed, in some cases judges suggest that such evidence is 
inappropriate. In Interlego, for example, Justice Gummow notes that- it 
is inappropriate to tender 'evidence of prospective purchasers that they 
would be deceived', because this contravenes the rule prohibiting opinion 
evidence on the very question the judge must decide.46 Strictly, this rule 
of evidence is no longer the law,47 but doubts about evidence of likely 
confusion persist.48 Only very occasionally is that absence. detrimen-
tal, and these cases tend to have particular characteristics, for example, 
the market is a special one where judicial 'common sense' is perhaps 
inapplicable.49 
A review of the comments made by judges about survey evidence gen-
erally, or particular surveys, confirms the difficulties faced by a. party 
seeking to tencl_~r such evidence. No doubt some occasions where c~urts 
I 
reject survey evidence are justified. In some cases, there are good reasons 
44 Arn'otts, 362-3; Srate Government Insurance Corporat.ion, 513;Johnson & Johnson Australia 
Pty Ltd v. Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 21 IPR 1, 15; Cadbury (No. 8)';-"574. . 
45 See, e.g., Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v. IPC Media Pry Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 28; Natural 
waters of Viti Ltd v. Dayals (Fijz) Artesian u.'ilters Ltd (2007) 71 IPR 571~ 579 ('Natural 
waters of Viti'); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation and Anor v. South Australian 
Brewing Co. Ltd (1996) 66 FeR 451,471-2; TGI Friday's Inc. v. TGI Friday's Australia 
Pty Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 444; United Realty Co. Pry Ltd v. BSP & GS Property Group Pry 
Ltd [2003] NSWSC 419. 
46 (1991) 25 IPR 65, 107-8. 
47 See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s. 80; discussed in Cadbury Schweppes Pry Ltd v; Darrell 
Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 72 IPR 261,274-5. . 
48 Natural waters of Viti(2007) 71 IPR 571,579-80 (noting that evid~ce from consumers 
of reputation is unproblematic, but evidence of confusion is more problematic, and citing 
Interlego for that proposition). 
49 For example Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v. Next Publishing Pty Ltd· (2005) 222 ALR 
127 (target consumers were 'tween' girls whose likely response to similarities between 
magazines was not something a judge could determine). 
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for a judge to refuse to rely on survey evidence tendered by a party: the 
sample may be too small or unbalanced;50 the methodology may not be 
explained;51 the survey may read more like a petition than evidence;52 
or the questions may be poorly worded.53 In other cases, the problem 
is timing. In passing off litigation, the risk of confusion is considered 
as at the time the impugned conduct started. In one recent case, the 
impugned conduct commenced in 1993, but the legal proceedings did 
not commence until 2006 and the survey - on which the court did not 
rely - was not conducted until 2009.54 Other occasions, however, are 
less obviously justifiable. For example, the courts have often critiqued 
surveys for placing consumers in artificial circumstances, removed from 
the context in which goods or services are actually purchased, such that 
no reliance can be placed on the results. 55 Such comments deserve to 
be questioned. Is evidence of a carefully conducted psychological exper-
iment or survey, designed by an expert to test the impact of a mark, and 
conducted according to high standards 56 really so artificial as to reduce 
its reliability? More importantly, is it any more artificial than the mech-
anisms of which courts do more happily rely on, such as single instances 
of confused consumers, or judicial intuition? 
Nor have the courts made available much guidance to practitioners on 
how best to provide survey evidence. For example, the Federal Court 
50 CA Henschke & Co. v. Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1999) 47 IPR 63; Cadbury Schweppes 
Pty Ltd v. Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops PLy Ltd (No. 4) (2006) 69 IPR 23 ('Cadbury 
(No.4)'); ConAgra; Armor All Products Corporation v. CRC Chemicals Australia Pry Ltd 
(1993) 28 IPR 77 (247 people approached but only 15 gave statutory declarations). 
51 Re Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v. Power Brewing Company Limited [1992] FeA 638. 
52 Osgaig PLy Ltdv. Ajisen (Melbourne) Pry Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 156. The complainant restau-
rant tendered a list of people who claimed to have eaten at the applicant's restaurant, 
had noticed the respondent's sign, and immediately thought the new restaurant was 
connected to the applicant's restaurant. 
53 South Australian Brewing Co. Pty Ltd v. Carlton & United Breweries Ltd (2001) 185 AiR 
719 (questions did nor sufficienrly distinguish between use of the word Showdown as a 
mark, and use of the word to refer to certain AFL games). 
54 Optical 88 v. Optical 88 (No.2) [2010] FeA 1380. For other cases where timing has 
been an issue, see South Australian Brewing Co. Pty Ltd v. Carlton & United Breweries Ltd 
(2001) 185 ALR 719 (survey conducted shortly after media publicity of an interlocutory 
injunction in the relevant proceedings); Kellogg [1999] FCA 1610 (survey conducted in 
1998 but impugned conduct started in 1992); Sydney Markets Ltd v. Sydney Flower Mar-
ket Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 124 (survey conducted in 2000, after applicant had commenced 
promotional activities). 
55 See, e.g., Interlego (1991) 21 IPR373, 412; Cadbury (No. 4),37; Kellogg [112]; The Ritz 
Hotel Ltd v. Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 12 IPR 417, 474; State Government Insurance 
Corporation, 528-9. 
56 Standards that likely exceed the standards applied to the many market surveys actually 
acted on by companies in designing marketing campaigns. 
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of Australia Practice Note on Survey Evidence57 is concerned with pro-
cedure only. In essence, it states that parties intending to obtain survey 
evidence should give notice of that intention, and the details of the survey, 
to their opponents and attempt to reach agreement on how the survey is 
to be conducted. It is also frequently ignored, 58 and no wonder: /based 
on the decision in Eveready v. Gillette, failure to comply with the Prac-
tice Note does not make survey evidence inadmissible.59 In that case, in 
fact, the Federal Court allowed the opponent to tender expert evj4ence 
critiquing a survey - although the opponent made no such cOIllIl1ents 
during the opportunity offered during the Practice Note .process~'60 For 
as long as this judicial attitude prevails, there is little 'reason for aij. oppo-
nent to seek to improve the other party's evidence by offering critique 
prior to the survey being conducted. 
Parties must feel as if they are damned if they test consumel:' confusion-
and damned if they do not. However, given that coUrts do not treat sur-
vey or empirical evidence of confusion as 'necessary, parties are less likely 
to be damned, perhaps, if they do not. This present situation concerning 
the use of surveys of all kinds is unsatisfactory. Courts' equivocal atti-
tudes increase the likelihood of wasted costs, both in obtaining evidence 
that will be largely ignored, and in court and expert time arguing over 
admissibility and weight. The very low usage of surveys over the last 
decade (10.4 percent) indicates that parties are responding rationally to 
this situation by simply avoiding such evidence altogether. 
VI. Policy proposals 
Richard Posner has suggested a rule that weak statistical evidence should 
be excluded from evidence to avoid confusing judges who have diffi-
culty understanding statistics. 61 We do not think that limiting or ignor-
ing survey evidence is a good solution. We understand the 'reluctance 
of the courts to turn questions of everyday consumer behaviour into 
battlegrounds for experts,62 with the costs attendant on such a devel-
opment. However, we do not believe that the best answer is to'refuse 
57 Now Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 13 - Survey Evidence, 25 September 
2009. 
58 Cadbury Schweppes Pf[JJ Ltd v. Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops ~ Ltd [2006] peA 364; Re 
Castlemaine Perkins Ltd v. Power Brewing Company Limited [1992] FCA 638. 
59 Eveready Australia Pty Ltd v. Gillette Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 47 IPR 327. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Richard Posner, 'The Law and Economics of the Economic ExPert Witness '''(1 999) 13 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 91. , 
62 Cadbury (No.8), 578; Car Media Pty Ltd v. Opti-HealthcarePty Ltd (2003] FCA 133 
[55]. ' 
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such evidence. As aptly stated by Jacob Schmookler, 'we have a choice 
of using ... statistics cautiously and learning what we can from them, or 
not using them and learning nothing about what they alone can teach 
US'.63 The Full Federal Court stated in Arnotts, 'information is preferable 
to intuition'. 64 It cannot be the case that psychologists' and marketers' 
increasing insights into how consumers process and respond to different 
aspects of marketing are irrelevant to the application of laws which have 
as their key goal preventing the deception or confusion of consumers. 
We suggest that a better approach would be for courts to state more 
clearly their requirements for acceptable market research evidence. The 
last judgment of the Full Federal Court giving serious guidance on the 
use of surveys in trade mark or passing off cases, Interlego, is now twenty 
years old) and precedes both important changes to the law of evidence,65 
and, no doubt, refinements in market research techniques and cognitive 
psychology. It might even be possible to develop model questions and 
sampling methods to help parties design their process for gathering evi-
dence. For proposals such as model survey questions or guidelines for 
the preparation of survey evidence to work, it would likely be necessary 
to include them in the court's guidelines to practitioners. This could be 
done by development of the existing Federal Court of Australia Practice 
Note on Survey Evidence. 66 
This would require a dialogue between lawyers and experts in psychol-
ogy. The learning would not, we expect, be all in one direction. Lawyers 
could afford to learn more about how consumers respond, both con-
sciously and unconsciously, to various aspects of branding. They could 
also learn more about the methods which have been developed to ensure 
that, so far as possible, individual responses to surveys are an accurate 
reflection of the individual's untutored response to stimuli like brands 
or product packaging. In turn, cognitive psychologists and marketing 
experts could learn more about the limits to the law's concern about 
consumer confusion. Not every form of consumer confusion will justify 
the law's intervention. An open discussion between these differing areas 
of expertise could help in two ways. It could perhaps help the clearer, 
more coherent development of legal rules relating to trade mark infringe-
ment and passing off. Most importantly, it could help ensure decisions 
are made based on the best available evidence. 
63 Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1966),56. 
64 Arnotts, 362 (Lockhart, Wilcox and Gummow JD. _ 65 See above n. 47. 
66 Now Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note eM 13 - Survey Evidence, 25 September 
2009. 
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Appendix A - Variable definitions 
Table AI. Variable definitions 
Variable 
Win 
Similar marker; 
SimilarTM 
First instance or 
appeal 
Case type 
Value 
Yes=l if a 
complete or 
partial win, 
No=O 
Same=3 
Similar=2 
Different= 1 
More similar= 1 
Less similar=O 
Forced choice: 
Trial! Appeal! 
Reminance 
TM 
infringement, 
passing off, both 
Definition 
If the party was successful on all issues pleaded 
(issues being either TM infringement or s. 
52!passing off), then a win was recorded by a 
'Yes'. Conversely a loss on those issues w~s 
recorded by a 'No'. If the party won on only a 
subset of the issues, then it was recorded as 
'Partial'. If a winlloss was unclear (for example if 
the case was sent back to a lower court on 
remitter), then the· cases was recorded as 
'Partial'. 
Manually coded. An example of 'Same' wO.uld 
be an applicant and respondent in the 
'Restaurant' services business. An example of 
'Similar' would be an applicant in the 'Game 
Manufacturing' business vs. a respondent in the 
'Game ReconditiQning' business. An example of 
'Different' would be an applicant in 'Hotel 
services' vs. a respondent 41 'Restaurant 
services'. 
Coding was based on the. Sarel-Marmorstein 
test. Trade marks or get-ups were coded 'More' 
if marks are 'identical or very close in·aural and 
visual similarity' for example MAGNllITE and 
l\.1.AGNI-LIGHTS. All other cases. were coded 
as 'Less'; for example 'BIG APPLE DEil' and 
'BIG BAGELS DEll' are 'Less'. 
Where the case was a first hearing (including an 
interlocutory hearing), then the case was coded 
as 'First Instance'. Where the case was an appeal 
from a lower court (but not an appeal from the 
ATMO), the case was coded as 'Appeal'. Where 
the case was a remittance from a higher court~ 
the case was coded as 'Remittance'. Note that 
appeals from the ATMO were coded separately_ 
If the case had a TM infringement argument but 
not a passing of£ls. 52 argument, then it was 
recorded as 'TM Infringement'._ If the case had a 
s. 52 or passing off argument, then it was coded 
as 'Passing Off. If the case had both a TM 
infringement and a s. 5Z passing off argument 
then it was coded as 'Both'. 
(cont.) 
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Table Al. (cont.) 
Variable 
Counterfeit YIN 
Survey Expert 
SurveyRely 
ExpertRely 
ConfusionLed 
ReputationLed 
Overseas 
Company, 
PrivateCompany, 
PublicCompany, 
'Other' 
Value 
Yes=l, No=O 
Yes=l, No=O 
Yes=l, No=::O 
Yes=l, No=O 
Definition 
Countedeit cases were classified according to 
Note 14 of the TRIPS agreement which states 
that '(a) "counterfeit trademark goods" shall 
mean any goods, including packaging, bearing 
without authorization a trademark which is 
identical to the trademark validly registered in 
respect of such goods, or which cannot be 
distinguished in its essential aspects from such a 
trademark, and which thereby infringes the 
rights of the owner of the trademark in question 
under the law of the country of importation' . 
Each case was scanned to determine whether an 
expert or survey evidence was used. Multiple 
pieces of evidence could be recorded for each 
case. Each piece of evidence was defined 
according to whether it was tendered by the 
applicant or respondent. 
Each case was scanned to determine which 
evidence was relied in the court's decision. 
Each case was scanned to determine whether 
evidence was led to prove confusion, or 
misrepresentation; or reputation. 
The business status of the party was manually 
coded from the name given on the court records. 
All private companies which were subsidiaries of 
public companies were coded as Public 
Company. Company structure was identified 
from ASIC and IBISWorld databases and the 
internet. 'Other' includes unincorporated 
entities such as individuals, statutory bodies, etc. 
